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This paper presents a new approach to the development of 
health management solutions which can be applied to both 
new and legacy platforms during the conceptual design 
phase. The approach involves the qualitative functional 
modelling of a system in order to perform an Integrated 
Vehicle Health Management (IVHM) design – the 
placement of sensors and the diagnostic rules to be used in 
interrogating their output. The qualitative functional 
analysis was chosen as a route for early assessment of 
failures in complex systems. Functional models of system 
components are required for capturing the available system 
knowledge used during various stages of system and IVHM 
design. MADe™ (Maintenance Aware Design 
environment), a COTS software tool developed by PHM 
Technology, was used for the health management design. A 
model has been built incorporating the failure diagrams of 
five failure modes for five different components of a UAV 
fuel system. Thus an inherent health management solution 
for the system and the optimised sensor set solution have 
been defined. The automatically generated sensor set 
solution also contains a diagnostic rule set, which was 
validated on the fuel rig for different operation modes taking 
into account the predicted fault detection/isolation and 
ambiguity group coefficients. It was concluded that when 
using functional modelling, the IVHM design and the actual 
system design cannot be done in isolation. The functional 
approach requires permanent input from the system designer 
and reliability engineers in order to construct a functional 
model that will qualitatively represent the real system. In 
other words, the physical insight should not be isolated from 
the failure phenomena and the diagnostic analysis tools 
should be able to adequately capture the experience bases. 
This approach has been verified on a laboratory bench top 
test rig which can simulate a range of possible fuel system 
faults. The rig is fully instrumented in order to allow 
benchmarking of various sensing solution for fault 
detection/isolation that were identified using functional 
analysis.  
1. INTRODUCTION 
Initial research on development of IVHM solutions focused 
on fault identification during operations and maintenance. 
This research direction culminated with the development of 
model-based reasoning software tools capable of comparing 
the observed behaviour with the expected behaviour of the 
system in order to identify abnormal conditions and 
eventually performing run-time repairs. Livingstone and its 
extension L2, HyDe from NASA, Rodon™ from Combitech 
(2012), TFPG FACT, ReasonPro™ (2012) from Impact 
Technologies are just a few COTS and open source model-
based reasoners that use system configuration and 
qualitative or quantitative behavioural models for 
developing fault detection/isolation procedures. A second 
research direction in developing IVHM solutions is 
supported by design analysis. These types of analysis are 
typically carried out for either investigations regarding 
system‟s potential to realize the health management goals – 
as a system design aid. Many different software tools like 
eXpress™ from DSI Int. (DSI, 2012), TEAMS™ from 
Qualtech Systems Inc. (QSI, 2012), ADVISE, Design 
PHM™ from Impact Technologies have been developed to 
aid the design of IVHM solutions, to minimize diagnostic 
ambiguity and to optimize diagnostic tests for sensitivity 
and accuracy (Keller, Baldwinm Ofsthun, Swearingen, 
Vian, Wilmering & Williams 2007). The reasoning and 
testability tools can be utilized during the Detailed Design 
phase of a system. 
 
The first response in the research community to shift the 
assessment of failures and associated risks into the 
Preliminary Design phase focused on employing safety and 
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reliability analysis. System safety analyses typically include 
Fault Tree analysis, Event Tree analysis, and Probabilistic 
Risk Assessments. The most common of these is the Fault 
Tree Analysis (FTA), which is constructed to perform a 
Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA). In an FHA, safety 
engineers identify unacceptable design features and propose 
design or usage changes that will mitigate the failure effects 
and satisfy safety requirements. FTA identifies system high- 
level failures that could result in loss of life or costly system 
equipment.  For each of these critical functions, the safety 
engineer performs a functional analysis of how the system 
works in normal operating conditions, then determines 
which failure modes could lead to the occurrence of the 
critical system functional failure. FTA are characterized by 
a top-down approach, which starts with the identification of 
a high-level failure event continued by the revealing of the 
contributing events that could lead to the occurrence of that 
high-level event. Software tools supporting the Safety 
Analysis process include but are not limited to CAFTA™, 
Fault Tree +™, and Saphire™. The most frequently types of 
reliability analysis are carried out using Failure Modes and 
Effects (Criticality) Analysis and System Reliability 
Predictions. FMEA/FMECA typically starts with the lowest 
level hardware (piece-part FMEA/FMECA) or system 
functions (functional FMEA/FMECA), by determining the 
fundamental failure modes that have a direct effect on those 
piece-parts or functions. The next FMEA step is the 
representation of system functional effects at successive 
indenture levels of the system. A FMECA adds the notion 
of failure criticality to a FMEA The failure rates of the 
associated failures are often taken into consideration. 
Software tools supporting the Reliability Analysis process 
include but are not limited to OCAS™, Isograph™, 
Relex™.  
 
Over the last decade, industry and academia have tried to 
integrate conceptual system design and diagnostic design 
into a common platform, in order to improve the overall 
system performance and availability (Brignolo, Cascio, 
Console, Dague, Dubois, Dressler, Millet, Rehfus & Struss 
2001; Kurtoglu, Johnson, Barszczm Johnson, & Robinson 
2008; Glover, Cross, Lucas, Stecki, and Stecki, 2010). A 
necessary condition for creating this platform is the 
adoption of a recognised common ontology (Wilmering, 
2008). Wilmering highlighted that the two main challenges 
in the development of this ontology:  
• Information re - use;  
• Integration of the tools.  
Each manufacturer of complex systems seems to have 
developed their own methods and apparatus for integration 
of system engineering, testability, diagnosability and 
reasoning tools.   
 
Since most of the IVHM related research focuses on fault 
detection and isolation during system operation and system 
maintenance, approaching the IVHM design stage is still in 
its early beginnings (Walker & Kapadia, 2010). Existing 
tools use different techniques and methods for system 
representation and diagnostic development and have a wide 
range of capabilities and performance. There is still the need 
to develop reliable benchmarks to quantitatively assess tool 
performance and effectiveness. The Diagnostic Competition 
defined by NASA Ames Research Centre is a good example 
of how to find the best diagnostic solution among tools 
generally used during the Detailed Design phase (Kurtoglu, 
Narasimhan, Poll, Garcia, Kuhn, de Kleer, van Gemund, & 
Feldman, 2009). Our research is trying to complement the 
above mentioned research, by evaluating various COTS 
software tools capable of integrating IVHM development 





Figure 1. COTS IVHM Design software tools 
 
This paper focuses on the use of functional analysis for the 
development of IVHM solutions. This type of analysis 
enables the integration of system failures analysis 
(traditionally carried out during the Preliminary Design 
phase through safety and reliability analysis) into the 
Conceptual Design phase for a new system. This approach 
allows for a better understanding of the failure mechanism, 
for a more precise identification of fault propagation paths 
throughout the system, and for a better system design 
against the faults that might arise once the system is 
deployed into operations. 
 
When developing a reliable functional model for a complex 
system it is necessary to have access to a rigorously defined 
taxonomy. The origins of the functional approach used in 
design dates back to the mid „80s (Hubka, V. & Ernst Eder, 
W., 1984) (Pahl, G. & Beitz, W., 1988) and it is attributed 
to the European schools of design as identified by Stone & 
Wood (2000) and Malin, & Throop (2007). Pahl states that 
the quality of a system has to be built-in from the beginning 
of the design process and maintained throughout the whole 
production process. This will insure a high degree of 
availability, once the system is deployed into its operational 
environment He goes even further; emphasizing that up to 
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planning and design work. Assuming this, it can be 
stipulated that initiating a failure analysis from the 
conceptual  design  phase will  have  a  positive  impact  on  
the  quality  of  the  system  being designed. Later on, this 
approach generated different views (Ulrich & Eppinger, 
1995; Ullman, 1997) in the USA.  A consistent review of 
the ontology of functions, entities and problems, relevant to 
the engineering world and used by FMECA was carried out 
by Rudov-Clark, Stecki, and Stecki (2009) and it was 
concluded that the taxonomy built by Stone was the most 
generic taxonomy, suitable for a wide range of engineering 
applications, so it was used in supporting the functional 
analysis inside MADe™. It has been demonstrated in the 
last decade that functional modelling is a key step in the 
system conceptual design process, whether original or 
redesign (Stone & Wood, 2000). Stone‟s original taxonomy 
was considerable extended in the last years by exploiting 
component function-based behavioural modelling as part of 
the system engineering process (Hutchenson, McAdams, 
Tumer, 2012). Functional representations can be identified 
in both domains of software and hardware safety and 
reliability. The many forms of system safety and reliability 
analysis such as Fault Tree, Event Tree, FMECAs and 
Probabilistic Risk Assessments are important stages during 
system development as part of the Preliminary Design stage. 
The main drawback of these methods is that they cannot be 
applied at the Conceptual Design stage, since at this point 
models are not fully documented, the knowledge repository 
is not available, and accurate probability numbers are not 
defined with confidence.  The function based design 
paradigm was further explored by Tumer, as part of the 
research focused on failure analysis of complex systems. 
She emphasized the integration of failure analysis for 
software driven hardware systems into the Conceptual 
Design stage (Tumer & Smidts, 2011). Kurtoglu and 
Tumer‟s research formed the baseline for the creation of a 
unified functional fault identification and propagation 
framework as part of early design stage of a new generation 
of high tech high value systems (Kurtoglu & Tumer, 2008).  
 
The use of system functional analysis as part of the system 
design can enhance the confidence of safety analysis at the 
early stages and aid throughout the development of system 
health management capability. Health management design is 
generally undertaken in order to support fault detection 
strategies, fault isolation strategies and design of testability 
solutions. Fault detection analysis calculates the percentage 
of system faults that can be detected by defined tests. Fault 
isolation analysis determines the failure ambiguity groups 
that will result from exercising the defined tests over the 
fault universe. Testability analysis sometimes associated 
with sensor set definition and optimization will determine 
the optimal sequence of tests to be implemented based on 
the fault space, defined tests, and other optimization criteria 
(practicality, cost, weight, reliability). As designs become 
more complex, defining and implementing a testability 
solution becomes more challenging. Ideally, health 
management capability must be developed concurrent with 
the design itself. Current practice does not facilitate an 
automatic feedback loop between test engineers and system 
design engineers. This feedback can be achieved through the 
incorporation of health management development process in 
the early design stage of the asset.   
 
The functional modelling approach uses functions and flows 
to describe the system. Clear ontology should be provided 
with each functional model in order to ensure others can 
read it, as they might represent a blueprint of the system 
using a different ontology.  
 
MADe™ software tool was selected for being the only 
COTS software that employs functional analysis as a 
method to design IVHM solution during the Conceptual 
Design phase of a new asset. The software provides a clear 
ontology, which can be used simultaneously by system 
designers, reliability-availability-maintainability engineers 
and IVHM designers in modelling the real asset and running 
specific type of analysis for each individual field. Another 
reason behind the selection of this package is the built-in 
connection between functional modelling and behavioural 
modelling within the same model. This connection allows 
for a fast and robust identification of the fault propagation 
paths throughout the system. Additional reasons behind the 
selection of this tool were the early validation and 
reusability of models, its ability to model systems/sub-
systems/components/parts and the automated support for 
safety/reliability analysis. 
 
This paper is the first of a series which highlights the pros 
and cons of existing COTS software tools employed during 
the health management development process. The objectives 
of this particular research are to establish the capability and 
utility of the MADe implementation of functional analysis 
in conceptual design of a health monitoring system for a 
laboratory based fuel system typical of that found on UAV 
aircraft.  The items considered are: i) development of the 
fuel system functional and behavioural model ii) sensor set 
optimization for identification of selected faults and iii) 
challenges encountered throughout the implementation of 
the health management solution. 
 
This paper contributes to the transformation of state of the 
art software tools into state of practice by identifying the 
advantages and shortcomings in building a functional model 
to aid the development and integration of IVHM Design 
into the Conceptual Design phase of a complex system.  
2. FUEL SYSTEM  TEST BED 
Integrated systems such as those supplying fuel to aircraft 
engines are evolving to higher complexity with each 
generation and their faults are consequently becoming more 




difficult to diagnose. On the other hand, the demands for 
extreme reliability imposed by the regulators and 
maximized availability imposed by the operators are 
continuously increasing. 
We aim to take a relative simple fuel system, to illustrate the 
key steps of the diagnostic analysis using functional analysis 
and to implement the output of this analysis within an 
IVHM solution which meets the initial fault detection and 
isolation requirements. A schematic diagram of the fuel 
system is presented in Figure 2a. The fuel system contains a 
motor driven external gear pump with internal relief valve, a 
shut off valve, one filter,  two tanks (main tank and sump 
tank, the last one emulating the engine), non-return valve, 
three-way valve to switch between recirculation and engine-
feed mode, variable restrictor to simulate engine injection 
and back pressure when partially closed. The fuel system is 
representative of a small UAV engine feed. The diagnostic 
analysis will focus on the filter, pump, shut-off valve, pipes 
and nozzle failure modes. Five failure modes that are 
emulated on the rig are: filter clogging from foreign matter, 
pump degradation, valve stuck in a midrange position, leak 
in the main line, and a clogged nozzle. 
 
Figure 2a. Fuel system schematic 
The fuel rig can accommodate various faults with different 
degrees of severity. When a filter clogs, the flow through 
the filter reduces and the pressure difference measured 
across the filter increases. The filter failure was emulated by 
replacing the filter component with a Direct-acting 
Proportional Valve (DPV1). Valve position fully open is 
equivalent to a healthy filter; partially closed being 
equivalent to a clogged filter with a particular degree of 
severity. Various degrees of severity of this fault can be 
simulated by varying the DPV position.  In this manner, 
incipient, slow progression, cascading and abrupt types of 
faults can be simulated on the rig and the ability of the 
functional approach to model and address such conditions 
can be assessed. The physical implementation of the fuel 
system test bed is depicted in Figure 2b. 
The physical system allows the testing and validation of 
various IVHM models and the assessment of the analyses 
carried out using such models. Prior the construction of the 
physical system, a physical simulation model was developed 
during the fuel system design phase using a CAE COTS 
software tool: SimulationX™ from ITI. This modelling 
phase encompasses basically the sensibility studies carried 
out during the fuel system design phase in order to specify 
in a correct manner the components/system performance in 
order to meet the specified system requirements. 
 
Figure 2b. Fuel system test bed 
The fuel system designer is the one who can get the first 
insights into the system failure world, by using physical 
simulation models (as fluid-flow SimulationX™ model) to 
recreate various faulty scenarios. This knowledge should be 
incorporated into the diagnostic analysis models in order to 
ensure the consistency and accuracy of such models. The 
novelty of this work resides in the ability of simultaneously 
simulating various fuel system faults on the real system, in a 
simulation environment and in a functional model. The next 
section will describe the development of a functional model 
capable of aiding the development of the fuel system IVHM 
capability. 
3. MADE FUNCTIONAL MODELLING FRAMEWORK APPLIED 
TO THE FUEL SYSTEM    
Functional modelling makes use of a system model which 
decomposes the main system function(s) into smaller 
functions which are well defined for each component. This 
enables the assessment of the correct functionality of the 
system. The taxonomy used by this software package has 
nine major classes of functions, presented in Table 1.  Each 
class further expands to other functions.  
A primary element of any functional modelling approach is 
the representation of real world information corresponding 
to the input and output for the previously defined functions.  
These elements are represented by flows.  
Three categories of flows, namely energy, signal and 
material were employed to capture system‟s characteristics. 
Some of the previously defined functions can accept any 


























types (e.g. all three functions - to transfer, to transmit, and to 
transport belong to the same functional class - to channel, 
but, the transfer function accepts all type of flows; the 
transmit deals with energy or signal types of flow, while the 
transport can be used only in conjunction with material 
flow). Energy flows are depicted with red, signals with blue 
and material with green in later diagrams. 
For the functional layer to be completed according to the 
method described in section 3, the links between all 
components have to be defined. This is achieved by 
translating the real world information exchange into distinct 
type of flows and by associating these as inputs and outputs 
for the functions defined already. These flows represent a 
measurable characteristic for the function (Kirschman, 
1996) and are used during the Preliminary Design phase. 
The flow related information is mainly useful in supporting 
Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA), 
where failures are related to the discrepancy in flow 
properties.  
Class Description 
Branch To cause a material or energy to no longer 
be joined or mixed 
Channel To cause a material or energy to move from 
one location to another 
Connect To bring two materials or energies together 
Control To alter or govern the size or amplitude of 
material, signal or energy 
Convert To change from one form of material or 
energy to another 
Provide To accumulate or provide material or energy  
Signal To provide information 
Stop To cease or prevent the transfer of material, 
signal or energy 
Support To firmly fix a material into a defined 
location or to secure an energy into a 
specific course 
Table 1: Function classes provided by MADe 
Figures 3a and 3b are two snapshots of the fuel system 
functional model. Figure 3a describes the function of the 
pump motor: to convert the electric energy and a specific 
analogue value into mechanical rotational energy. 
Components can be fully described following this functional 
approach by a single function (e.g. gear pump motor) or a 
combination of function (see the shut-off valve functions) as 
described in Figure 3b. 
 
To convert – to change from one form of energy (electrical 
energy) or material to another form of energy (mechanical – 
angular velocity) 
Figure 3a. Functional model schematic for gear pump motor 
component 
The gear pump supplies the system with the hydraulic 
energy necessary to provide the flow rate and to transfer the 
potential contamination down the line.  
The pipe between the pump and the shut-off valve transmits 
the hydraulic energy received from the pump while the 
shut-off valve has a suite of two different functions as 
follows: to channel the hydraulic energy down the line in 
the next pipe and to regulate the hydraulic energy in 
response to the information received from the solenoid. 
Both components (the pipe and the shut-off valve) have an 
extra function: to transport the potential contamination in 




Figure 3b. Functional model schematic for gear 
pump motor, gear pump, pipe and shut-off valve 
components 
Within a functional model, the inputs and output are 
connected inside each component by a causal link. The 
model can capture the polarity of these causal links 
depending on the effect of the input on the output (Figure 
4a-Figure 4d). Each component functional model 
encapsulates the causality connection between two different 
types of flow. The pump motor functional model contains a 
positive connection between the voltage (the input flow 
presented as electrical energy) and the angular velocity 
(output flow presented as mechanical rotational energy). 
The same positive connection is found in the second 
connection (value-angular velocity). 





Figure 4a. Causal links between inputs and outputs flows for 
filter component 
 
Figure 4b. Causal links between inputs and outputs flows 
for pump motor component 
The function of the pump will be to supply flow rate as 
hydraulic energy by making use of angular velocity 
(provided by the motor) and the flow rate (provided by the 
inlet pipe). In order to obtain a consistent model, the output 
flows of a component have to match the input flows of the 
component positioned downstream.  
Figure 4c. Causal links between inputs and outputs flows for 
external gear pump component 
 
Figure 4d. Causal links between inputs and outputs flows 
for valve solenoid component 
Figure 5 presents the full functional model at the system 
level and also presents the exchange of information between 
components using specific types of flow.  
The reticence in using this tool is the fact that requires a 
change in failure addressing approach from physical to 
functional. Therefore it requires a fully adoption of its 
functional taxonomy in order to be able to emulate the real 
system into viable models. 
 At this point, a functional model can answer the questions 
related to fault propagations paths throughout the system 
(Glover, 2010). However some queries still remain about 
the causes of failures, how a system can fail, how critical 
each failure is and about the interaction between failures and 
their impact on the overall system capability. The answers 
to these questions can be revealed by populating the 
functional model with failure modes for all components and 
by focusing the analysis on the most critical or ones likely 
to be the most frequent. The functional model was 
populated with failure diagrams for five of the fuel system 
components: the filter, the gear pump, the shut-off valve, the 
pipe 04, and the nozzle. Once all the failure modes are 
defined, the system functional model is considered as being 
complete. 
Our main goal is to design an IVHM solution capable of 
discriminating between nominal/faulty cases and also 
capable of isolating all five faults. Since the fault universe is 
relatively small (five faults) we aim for 100% fault detection 
and isolation (no ambiguity groups).  
Often the failure modes are confused with failure 
mechanisms or the failure causes. To overcome this, the 
software under investigation uses a rigid terminology for 
failure descriptions: these must be characterized by causes, 
mechanism, faults, and symptoms. These four elements 
form a low level of abstraction regarding system knowledge, 
while the functional failure mode is considered to be a high 
level and will define the basis of the functional analysis.  
For example: a pipe component can leak or be clogged. 
These two failure modes are captured by the behavioural 
taxonomy as shown in Figure 6a.  
Causes are linked to mechanisms, which then lead into 
faults that are ultimately connected to functional failures. 
Mechanisms and faults can present particular symptoms and 
these are captured accordingly in the failure diagram. These 
symptoms are the expression of unintended/emerging 
behaviour of a faulty system. Figure 6b depicts the 
functional model of a pump, highlighting the inputs (speed, 
back pressure, and pump characteristic), the function (to 
produce flow), the intended output (the flow rate response 
including the normal/abnormal behaviour effects (flow rate 
OK, too high or too low)), the failure modes and their 
unintended/emerging behaviour (classified as symptoms). 
One of the failure modes affecting the pump is represented 




through a failure diagram by defining the cause(s), the 
mechanism(s) and faults that can be linked to the functional 
failure (of not supplying the required amount of hydraulic 
energy as volumetric flow rate). Due to the restrictions of 
the physics for this failure mode, this flow indicator can 
display either OK or too low, hence the negative causality 
between the fault concept and the functional failure concept. 
Three types of failure side effects are captured by linking 
the symptom concepts to the functional failure diagram 
previously defined as in Figure 6c. 
 
Figure 5. Fuel system functional model 
The unintended/emerging behaviours complement the 
development of the health management solution, as they 
allow the user to define built-in tests for the components 
affected by such behaviours in order to obtain a higher 
probability of detection. These sensing capabilities will 
work in conjunction to the functional sensing capabilities 
identified using the functional analysis. Symptom driven 
reasoning modules were proved to be extremely useful for 
discrimination between members of the same ambiguity 
group. 
Causes, mechanisms and faults are all external inputs to the 
model and do not arise from the intrinsic functional 
representation of the components. Causes and faults selected 
for inclusion might be the ones which most frequently occur 
(based on service experience) or the ones which the safety 
analysis considers most dangerous. 
 
Figure 6a. Failure mode diagram, pipe example 
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Figure 6c.  Pump failure diagram, symptoms capturing 
All elements of a failure diagram can be characterized by 
criticality numbers for difficulty of detection, occurrence, 
probability, progression rate and severity. We will first 
consider the functional failure of a pipe of not being able to 
transport the hydraulic energy as pressure. The criticality 
settings for this functional failure are shown in Figure 7. 
System Designers, Reliability Availability and 
Maintainability (RAM) analysts, IVHM designers and 
logisticians are able to populate the failure diagrams through 
criticality coefficients using their own experience and 
information expertise. Variability in detection difficulty can 
be represented within the functional model by choosing the 
functional failure to be detectable either during a flight test 
or a ground inspection or by setting it as a non-detectable 
type of failure.  Occurrence, frequency and severity of a 
failure may be treated using the same approach. These 
settings will be directly fed into the calculation of Risk 
Priority Number (RPN) for each individual fault, enabling 
the realization of a complete map for safety, reliability, 
availability and IVHM design analysis.  A real advantage of 
this procedure is the consistency obtained by using the same 
tool across the entire development process.   
 
 
Figure 7. Failure diagram - criticality settings 
By accommodating this system knowledge, the model 
generates a propagation table describing the effect of all 
failure modes on the system. This operation is undertaken 
by propagating the erroneous output flow of the components 
through the software Fuzzy Cognitive Map (FCM) 
capability. The propagation table represents the baseline for 
generating the list of the functional failures. Previous 
research proved that the IVHM design process built on 
physical failure assessment is highly error prone as it does 
not take into account the impact of failures on other system 
components. 
The functional model also supports safety and reliability 
analysis by performing the most common type of analysis: 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and FMECAs. It is not meant to 
replace the detailed analysis carried out by dedicated safety 
tools like: Isograph™, Relex™, CAFTA™, Saphire™ or 
Fault Tree+ but having these features as part of a functional 
modelling tool enhances the health management 
development process.  
Figure 8 illustrates the fault tree analysis for the fuel system 
with five faults: clogged filter, faulty gear pump, faulty 
shut-off valve, leaking pipe, clogged pipe. The five faults 
were propagated through the model using these failure 
diagrams in order to determine their end effects. The FTA 
incorporates a list of failure routes, which describes a 
sequence of events, eventually leading to a system failure. 
Figure 8a shows the fault tree display of a cut set with the 
failure of the filter marked in orange. The top element of the 
FTA is the function of the overall fuel system – to provide 
fuel – which in the case of a filter failure would be lost. The 
cut set represents the route through a fault tree between an 
event (system failure) and an initiator (component failure 
mode). 
 




Figure 8a. Fault tree displaying the cut set for filter failure 
The FTA is accompanied by the decomposition table of 
probability of occurrence (P(f)) and relative importance of 
each individual failure mode (RI%(F)) as in Figure 8b.  
Each component of the functional model is characterized 
from the criticality point of view by the duration of 
operation, mean time to repair and a failure distribution type 
(exponential or Weibull). A criticality analysis can be 
carried out by establishing a minimum threshold for 
criticality indicators or by activating the failure modes only 
for the components under investigation. The second option 
was selected for this study. Two types of reliability analyses 
were carried out using this software: functional reliability 
and hardware reliability. The results of the hardware 
reliability calculated using block diagrams are depicted in 
Figure 8c. Only the components that can be simulated on the 
test bed as being faulty were characterized through an 
exponential failure distribution defined by the part failure 
rate(\   hours), mean part failure rate (\   hours) and 
standard deviation (failure rate).  
 
Figure 8b. FTA results 
Within the same module of the software, the reliability 
analysis results can also be complemented by Monte Carlo 
simulations.  
The functional analysis allows for the automatic 
identification of the required set of sensors and the 
associated logic capable of detecting and isolating each fault 
within the fault universe. In the case of this study, the fault 
universe is constituted by a clogged filter, a degraded gear 
pump, a shut-off valve stuck mid range, a leaking pipe and a 
clogged nozzle.  
The sensor identification analysis enables the calculation of 
Fault Detection and Fault Isolation coefficients with 
reference to the entire fault universe. Fault Detection 
analysis calculates the percentage of system faults (defined 
as specific component failure modes) detected by the 
proscribed tests.  Fault Isolation analysis determines the 
failure ambiguity groups that will result from exercising the 
tests over the fault universe. 
 
 
Figure 8c. Fuel system - Hardware reliability 
IVHM designers require tools able to run what-if type of 
analyses in order to identify the optimum health 
management solution meeting the fault detection and fault 
isolation requirements.  Due to different types of restrictions 
in terms of weight, costs, performance, probability of 
detection of the HM solution on one side and sensor 
reliability on the other side, FDI coefficients might have to 
be dropped below the required figures. Ambiguity groups - 
collections of failure modes with the same system response - 
will appear in such situations. Once sensors have been 
identified, the diagnostic analysis also provides the core 
elements for a reasoning capability/expert system. Once a 
deviation of a particular parameter outside its nominal range 
is detected, the function of that component will be evaluated 
by examining high-level functional failure mode layers and 
the causes, mechanisms, faults and symptoms described in 
the lower levels of the model. 
4. SENSOR SET OPTIMISATION  
The fuel system sensor set optimization analysis is based on 










































mentioned before, the overall function of the fuel system is 
to provide a volume of fuel when commanded by an electric 
signal assuming that it was powered up.  
When each of the five faults is injected in the system 
through its own failure diagrams, the tool will generate a 
propagation path of the failure. The propagation paths are 
collated into a propagation table which will form the basis 
for the sensor set optimization process. Each line from the 
Table 2 represents the effects of the five failure modes on 
the output flow(s) of the other components.  
The vector (F.G.P.P.P.P.S.S.) represents the Filter pressure, 
Gear pump flow rate, Pipe 02 flow rate, Pipe 03 flow rate, 
Pipe 04 pressure, Nozzle flow rate, Shut-off valve flow rate, 
Sump tank volume output parameters. The arrow-up and 
arrow-down symbols mark the deviation of these parameter 
outside normal boundaries when a particular failure mode 
was injected and propagated throughout the functional 
model. 
For example, the first row of Table 2 shows the effects of a 
clogged filter on the system response. A clogged filter 
determines the flow rate in pipe 02 to decrease; this will 
impact the flow rate down the line in the gear pump, pipe 
03, pipe 04, shut-off valve and the sump tank.  
 
Table 2. Fuel system propagation table obtained using 
functional analysis 
The functional modelling technique (input flows linked to 
output flows throughout the functional layer) might induce 
the designer to model only the downstream effects of a 
particular fault. The Fuzzy Cognitive Maps (FCM) method 
employed by this tool also allows for modelling of upstream 
effects. The dotted red line in Figure 9 is the causal 
connection representing the effect of a clogged nozzle on 
the upstream component (Pipe 04). If a nozzle is getting 
clogged, the output parameter (flow rate) decreases. The 
variation of this flow rate parameter has an inversely 
proportional effect on the Pipe 04 input flow rate parameter 
increasing afterwards the output pressure. This behaviour 
could not have been achieved without the negative feedback 
loop depicted in Figure 9. The same technique will be 
replicated upstream using iterative loops throughout the 
system until all the effects of a clogged nozzle would be 
captured by the model. 
 
Figure 9. FCM Feedback loops 
A functional model will therefore be consistent when the 
propagation table generated by the model will replicate from 
a qualitative point of view the physics of the system under 
similar faulty conditions. 
The qualitative characteristics of each individual failure 
contained in the propagation table are processed by an 
optimization algorithm in order to identify the combination 
of elements which allow discriminating between them. The 
elements mentioned above are in fact the flows captured in 
the functional analysis and the type of flows will determine 
the type of sensors to be used to identify a particular fault. A 
detailed description of the sensor set discrimination analysis 
using this software is presented by Rudov-Clark (Rudov-
Clark, 2009). 
Functional analysis is a qualitative analysis. This type of 
qualitative analysis identifies the foundation of an HM 
solution for a given system for a known fault universe. As 
mentioned in the previous section, for this particular 
scenario of the fuel system, the fault universe is composed 
by five distinct faults. The optimization algorithm generates 
6 sensor set solutions, with maximum coverage and no 
ambiguity groups. One of the solutions contains four 
sensors and is presented in Figure 10 and it comprises of: 
S1 - a sensor measuring the static pressure after the Filter, 
S2 - a sensor measuring the flow rate after the Gear pump, 
S3 - a sensor measuring the flow rate after the Shut-off 
valve 
S4 - a sensor measuring the pressure in the Pipe 04. 
 
The components that need to be monitored are marked with 
green. The type of sensor is determined by the type of the 
output flow of those components. By making use of the 
output from these sensors, the analysis shows that it is 
possible to discriminate with 100% confidence between all 
five faults by using a particular diagnostic logic.  Obviously, 
this was expected as the structure of the fuel system is quite 
simple, and there are only five faults.  
Based on this analysis, the IVHM designer has information 
about the location of the sensors contained in each sensor 
set, and also information regarding the type of the 
monitored flow. All the sensor set solutions are 
complemented by fault detection, fault isolation and 
ambiguity group indicators (if any).  
Each sensor set also contains the diagnostic rules to be 
implemented on the real system to enable the fault 




identification. Most of the time, the diagnostic rules are 
associated with tests that are carried out during the 
diagnostic and troubleshooting procedures. 
Functional models are typically used for either analysis of a 
system‟s potential to realize health management goals – as a 
design aid - or to support execution of fault isolation 
reasoning. The output of the functional analysis represents 
the input to other tools that actually create, or help direct the 
creation of, executable system diagnostics.   The qualitative 
diagnostic layer produced by MADe will have to be 
complemented by a quantitative layer obtained by physical 
simulation of the system flows.  
 
  
Figure 10. One of the functional sensor set solutions 
Figures 11 shows the diagnostic rules associated with the 




 Degraded gear pump: 
 
 








Figure 11. Diagnostic rules for the optimized sensor set 
solution depicted in Figure 10 
 
These rules form the baseline for diagnostic engine of the 
fuel system. For example the function of the gear pump (to 
deliver a specific amount of flow rate) is classified as lost if 
the sensor monitoring the shut-off valve flow rate has an 
output value below nominal, the pressure in pipe 03 below 

























Pressure (Filter) is Low
Function (Filter) is Lost
Flow rate (Shut-off valve) is High
AND
Pressure (Pipe 03) is Low Pressure (Filter) is Low
Function (Pump) is Lost
Pressure (Pipe 03) is High
AND
Pressure (Pipe 04) is Low
Function (Shut-off valve) is Lost
Flow rate (Shut-off  valve) is Low
Function (Pipe 04) is Lost
Pressure (Pipe 04) is High
Function (Nozzle) is Lost




nominal values. In all other cases, the function is considered 
to be operating normally. In a similar manner, the other four 
diagnostic rules describe the lost of filter, shut-off valve, 
pipe and nozzle‟s functionality by making use of the output 
of the sensors (S1-S4). 
Information on weight, cost and reliability can be associated 
with each sensor in order to get a clear image of the 
comparison between different IVHM solutions (as in Table 
3). The software might further generate queries about 
various sensor set solutions as in Figure 12. 
 
 
Table 3. Sensor set additional information 
 
Figure 12. Sensor set comparison query 
The information generated by functional analysis can be 
further used by the HM designer in developing the 
executable HM solution and also by the system designer in 
analyzing the impact on the overall design once this solution 
is integrated with the asset. 
5. IVHM SOLUTION – VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION 
The sensor set solutions identified and highlighted in the 
previous section were embedded in the physical test bed and 
the functional diagnostic rules were assessed against 
physical simulation results. 
For each component, a physical degradation scenario was 
simulated and system behaviour in terms of pressure and 
volumetric flow rates were captured.   
Figure 13 shows the variation of the pressure parameters in 
various points of the system vs. the degradation of the filter. 
As described in section 2, the filter degradation was 
emulated by gradually closing the DPV1 (see Figure 2a). 
Nine degrees of severity were generated corresponding to 
100%, 90%, 80%, 70%, 60%, 50%, 40%, 30% and 
20%valve opening. Position 100% valve open corresponds 
to a healthy filter, 20% valve open corresponds to an almost 
clogged filter. The mean values of the volumetric flow rate 
and pressure for each set of data (1 minute at 1kHz) were 
plotted against valve opening coefficients and the results 
were interpolated.    
 
Although, a real operating environment might present more 
noise and the sensor sensitivity and accuracy as well as the 
parameters magnitude levels might be different on a real 
fuel system that in the test-bed, the effects of a failure mode 
on the real asset will be similar in both cases from a 
qualitative point of view. 
 
Clogged filter diagnostic rule: 
 
 
Figure 13. Pressure rates under a filter degradation scenario  
 
From a diagnostic perspective, the pressure drop across the 
filter is generally used for the identification of a clogged 
filter (SAE J905, 2009). Functional approach demonstrated 
that by using strictly the pressure after the filter (the green 
signal in Figure 13), this failure can be fully detected and 
isolated. This quantifies in the reduction of the number of 
sensors required to identify a clogged filter. It is widely 
accepted that the reliance on one fault indicator (pressure 
after the filter) is not a robust detection method however one 
Sensor set 1    Sensor set 2   Sensor set 3   
Sensor set 4    Sensor set 5   Sensor set 6
Weight
Cost
Total number of sensors
Reliability
Coverage
Pressure (Filter) is Low
Function (Filter) is Lost
Pressure before filter
High severity              Low severity
Pressure after filter
Pressure before shut-off valve
Pressure after shut-off valve
Pressure after nozzle
Healthy state















potential solution to make the indicator more reliable might 
be the use of multiple redundant indicators that provide a 
means for resolving differences (e.g. by “voting”). 
 
The degraded pump scenario was implemented by creating a 
leak after the pump component through the DPV2 (see 
Figure 2a). Initially, for the healthy situation, this valve was 
fully closed. Gradually, the DPV2 position was set to 10%, 
20%, 30%, 40%, 50%, 60%, 70%, 80%, 90% and 100% 
open. The mean values of the volumetric flow rate and 
pressure for each set of data (1 minute at 1kHz) were plotted 
against valve opening coefficients and the results were 
interpolated.  As in the previous case, difference between 
the emulation approach adopted here and the degradation of 
a real pump might exist however from a qualitative point of 
view, a degrade pump will provide a lower flow rate for the 
same load (system configuration) and same pump speed. On 
the test-bed, the pump controls have a feedback loop which 
keeps the pump speed constant at all time. 
The diagnostic rule for detection and isolation of a degraded 
pump combines the variation of three parameters: the 
increase of the flow rate through the shut-off valve 
(equivalent to a decrease in pressure difference across the 
shut-off valve), the decrease in the pressure measured after 
the pump and the decrease in the pressure after the filter. 
The consistency of the diagnostic rule can easily be verified 
by observing the variation of parameters P2, P3 and the 
difference between P2 and P3 in Figure 14. 
Degraded pump diagnostic rule: 
 
 
Figure 14. Pressure rates under a degraded pump scenario  
The malfunction of the shut-off valve (stuck in a midrange 
position) was implemented by adding the DPV3 in line with 
the shut-off valve (see Figure 2a). Initially, for the healthy 
situation, the DPV3 was fully open. Gradually, the direct-
acting proportional valve was closed and data was measured 
on the rig for 1 minute at 1kHz for the valve being 100%, 
90%, 80%, 70%, 60%, 50%, 40%, 30%, and 20% open. The 
mean values of the volumetric flow rate and pressure for 
each set of data were plotted against valve opening 
coefficients and the results were interpolated.   
The diagnostic rule for detection and isolation of a stuck 
shut-off combines the variation of two parameters: the 
increase in the pressure measured before the valve and the 
decrease in the pressure measured after the pump. The 
consistency of the diagnostic rule can easily be verified by 
observing the variation of parameters P3 and P4 in Figure 
15. 
Shut-off valve stuck mid range diagnostic rule: 
 
Flow rate (Shut-off valve) is High
AND
Pressure (Pipe 03) is Low Pressure (Filter) is Low
Function (Pump) is Lost













Pressure before shut-off valve




Pressure (Pipe 03) is High
AND
Pressure (Pipe 04) is Low
Function (Shut-off valve) is Lost





Figure 15. Pressure rates under a degraded shut-off scenario 
The leaking pipe scenario was implemented by creating a 
leak after the pump component through the DPV4 (see 
Figure 2a). Initially, for the healthy situation, this valve was 
fully closed. Gradually, the DPV4 position was set to 10%, 
20%, 30%, 40%, 50%, 60%, 70%, 80%, 90% and 100% 
open. The mean values of the volumetric flow rate and 
pressure for each set of data (1 minute at 1kHz) were plotted 
against valve opening coefficients and the results were 
interpolated.   
The diagnostic rule identifying a leak in the Pipe 04 implies 
the drop in the flow rate through the shut-off valve 
(equivalent to the flow throughout the system). The 
consistency of the rule can be verified by observing the 
variation of flow in Figure 16a. The flow rate through the 
shut-off valve parameter can be interpolated from the 
pressure difference across the shut-off valve as per Figure 
16b. The decrease of the flow rate through the shut-off valve 
is equivalent to the increase in the pressure drop across the 
valve (the difference between parameters P3 and P4).  
Leaking pipe diagnostic rule: 
 
 
Figure 16a. Flow rates under a leaking pipe scenario 
 
Figure 16b. Pressure rates under a leaking pipe scenario 
The clogged nozzle scenario was implemented by replacing 
nozzle component with DPV5 (see Figure 2a). Initially, for 
the healthy situation, this valve was fully open. Gradually, 
the DPV5 was closed and data was measured on the rig for 
1 minute for the valve being 100%, 90%, 80%, 70%, 60%, 
50%, 40%, 30%, and 20% open. The mean values of the 
volumetric flow rate and pressure for each set of data were 
plotted against valve opening coefficients and the results 
were interpolated.   
The diagnostic rule identified by the functional model as 
being capable of detecting and isolating the clogged nozzle 
involves the pressure measured before the nozzle. When this 
parameter increases above normal limits, the function of the 
nozzle is considered lost (equivalent to the nozzle being 
clogged). The consistency of this diagnostic rule can be 
verified by observing the variation of this parameter for all 
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Pressure after nozzle
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Low severity              High severity
Pressure before filter
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degrees of severity of a clogged nozzle scenario (P4 in 
Figure 17). 
Clogged nozzle diagnostic rule: 
 
 
Figure 17. Pressure rates under a nozzle degradation 
scenario  
To sum up, the sensor set solution identified by the 
functional analysis (four sensors – three pressure sensors 
and one flow meter) can be further minimized by inferring 
the flow rate from two of the existing pressure sensors. This 
second optimisation is strictly related to the implementation 
process of the sensor set solution on the real asset and is not 
part of the IVHM design process.  
In order to incorporate the sensor set solution on a real asset 
and to deploy the diagnostic rules as part of the IVHM 
solution, several calibration procedures have been 
performed. As implied in Figure 11, diagnostic rules for a 
sensor set solution contain qualitative information only. 
Faults are indicated by deviations from nominal healthy 
values using Low/High indicators without a quantitative 
threshold defining the separation between “normal” and 
“low” conditions or between “normal” and “high” 
conditions.  
6. DISCUSSION 
The fuel system test case demonstrates that functional 
analysis can support the initial evaluation and assessment of 
functional-failure risks of physical systems. Functional 
approach in general and MADe™ software in particular 




1. Functional modelling brings a reasonable degree of 
methodology to the future automated processes of 
impact analysis.  By integrating its rigorous taxonomy, 
functional modelling solves one of the shortcomings of 
the current IVMH design approach: the lack of a clear, 
unified and widely accepted ontology. 
2. The whole reason for introduction of functional 
analysis was to offer designers a tool to be used during 
the conceptual design when there is no physical 
system. No previous information needs to be provided 
to the model regarding possible fault propagation 
routes. Diagnostic analysis tools like eXpress™ 
(Hilberth, 1995; Gould, 2004), ADVISE (Keller, 
2007), TEAMS™ (QSI, 2012) require IVHM 
designers to explicitly build the fault propagation 
model by using causal relationships between part, 
component, sub-systems and systems. Regarding 
functional approach, only the information related to 
structural topology and system functionality are used 
as input parameters for configuring the model.  
3. If combined with the appropriate information like 
difficulty of detection, progression rate, occurrence, 
probability, severity, functional analysis can 
complement and/or substitute safety and reliability 
analysis. It allows the designers to focus on functional 
failures rather than physical failures.  
4. Another important feature of the functional analysis is 
its capability to identify end-effects (upstream and 
downstream) of a particular component failure mode. 
By employing FCM (Fuzzy Cognitive Maps) 
techniques, MADe is able to identify functional 
failures resulting from component interaction.  
5. Functional approach can easily handle high complexity 
factors of the analysis. Any number of 
parts/components/sub-systems or system failures can 
be introduced in the model using failure diagrams 
(cause-mechanism-fault-functional failure). The 
advantages of modelling a system using a high degree 
of complexity remain though in discussion. 
6. The health management solutions developed using this 
COTS functional analysis software become more 
reliable as they are constructed using models that 
incorporate simultaneously design, RAM and IVHM 
information.  
7. Considering the multitude of multidisciplinary data 
incorporated into a functional model, it can be 
Pressure (Pipe 04) is High
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concluded that functional analysis offers significant 
support for conceptual design analysis in vertical 
integration and system engineering. 
 
Cons: 
1. System designers might find the mindset shift from 
physical approach to functional approach difficult to 
adopt. The concepts underpinning the functional 
approach might be easier to be adopted by safety and 
reliability engineers. 
2. Functional failure analysis provides only qualitative 
predictions of system parameter changes. Further tests 
and calibration procedures have to be performed in 
order to transform the functional analysis output into 
executable code. 
3. It was demonstrated that the proposed instrumentation 
solutions obtained using functional approach are 
capable of detecting and isolating the faults defined in 
the fault universe. As they do not involve any physics, 
the authors have identified a drawback as no 
assessment can be undertaken regarding the efficiency 
of functional sensor set solutions for prognostic 
purposes at this stage. 
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS  
The paper has presented the results of an applied research 
project that combined functional analysis with behaviour 
simulation as a design aid for developing health 
management solutions. 
First of all, a functional model of a fuel rig was developed 
using MADe™ and a series of analyses to aid the health 
management development process were carried out. The 
model of the system incorporates all its components, 
topology, functions, failure modes and failure diagrams, in 
order to simulate failure propagation paths and local, next 
and end-effects on other components.  Care must be taken in 
setting up the functional model with the choice of 
component functions and inflow/outflow to these functions. 
The validation of the functional model consistency was 
made with reference to the physical simulation model of the 
same system. A functional model will be considered 
consistent when the functional propagation table 
incorporating failure effects on the system matches the 
physical propagation table containing the effects of similar 
failures. 
Secondly, functional modelling for IVHM design and fuel 
system design cannot be done in isolation. This paper 
described the steps required to correctly develop a 
functional model that will reflect the physical knowledge 
inherently known about a given system. This means that 
during this development process, the model required several 
amendments including the use of several feedback loops to 
replicate the upstream effects of a failure throughout the 
system in order to ensure good alignment with real physical 
behaviour. Since functional qualitative model makes explicit 
the essential distinction between normal and faulty 
conditions, it covers classes of components rather than 
individual ones, thus facilitating component libraries. The 
MADe™ framework employs modular, reusable function-
component-behaviour models that can be integrated using 
an industrial standard. 
Thirdly, the functional qualitative models offer means of 
expressing and exploiting approximate knowledge on a firm 
theoretical basis in a formal model.  For instance, 
knowledge about qualitative deviations of component 
behaviour is used to identify the detection and isolation 
diagnostic rules.   
If functional models are populated with reliability, 
availability and maintainability figures, the design engineers 
are able to systematically investigate functional-risks as 
early as possible during the design cycle. Simultaneously, 
the functional model increases the rate of success in 
deploying an IVHM solution with a reliable diagnostic 
logic. During the testing phase, the initial calibration of the 
diagnostic rules has to be done in conjunction with the 
physical simulation. This calibration will need further 
adjustments once the IVHM solution is fully deployed on 
the real system in real operating conditions.  
Besides functional analysis, a further input to the PHM 
community is the construction of physical fuel system test-
bed for assessment and validation of various IVHM design 
techniques. As future work, the diagnostic logic obtained 
using functional failure analysis will be tested on the real 
asset and the propagation of failures and assessment of their 
impact on the overall system capability will be compared 
with the results obtained by using other COTS IVHM 
design tools. 
Areas identified for future work include the implementation 
of the proposed functional techniques on a large-scale, 
highly complex landing gear system and on a central 
frequency changer house, both systems having huge 
downtimes and high repair costs associated. These systems 
will allow investigations regarding the efficiency of the 
functional approach when used in various domains 
(hydraulic and electric).  
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